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Abstract
We contribute to the understanding of how systemic risk arises in a network of
credit-interlinked agents. Motivated by empirical studies we formulate a network
model which, despite its simplicity, depicts the nature of interbank markets better
than a homogeneous model. The components of a vector Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
living on the vertices of the network describe the financial robustnesses of the agents.
For this system, we prove a LLN for growing network size leading to a propagation
of chaos result. We state properties, which arise from such a structure, and examine
the effect of inhomogeneity on several risk management issues and the possibility of
contagion.
AMS 2010 Subject Classifications: 60K35 ; 60H30 ; 91B30 .
JEL Classification: G18 ; G21 ; G23 .
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1 Introduction
Interbank lending patterns and financial contagion have been in the focus of central banks
and regulators already before, but predominantly since the financial crisis has started in
2007, succeeded by the government debt crisis in Europe. Consequently, there is a number
of empirical studies performed by central banks dealing with issues of contagion; see e.g.
[7, 9, 14, 15, 17, 20, 23]. However, as indicated in Mistrulli [14], data limitations - especially
not or only partly available bilateral exposures between agents - often enforced the use
of the so-called maximum-entropy method. This method actually rules out structural
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information about the market, while assuming that each bank lends to all others, possibly
leading to over- or underestimation of contagion (cf. Mistrulli [14] for a discussion and
data analysis). With respect to structural properties of interbank markets, the empirical
studies [4] for the Austrian market, [18] for the Fedwire interbank payment network, [5]
for the Brazilian market, and [6] for the German market share the same finding: There is
a small number of highly connected big banks acting as financial intermediaries for a large
number of smaller banks, which mostly do not interact directly. Our approach weakens
the homogeneity assumptions by suggesting a more realistic model allowing for top-tier
and lower-tier banks.
Several studies model the financial market as a random graph. Financial contagion
in the market is then treated by investigating and simulating a discrete bankruptcy cas-
cade, which is initiated by some triggering mechanism like a first passage event; see e.g.
[1, 3, 10, 13]. Another approach is based on mean field models of interacting systems of
diffusions as used in physics to model the evolution of particles. This yields a homoge-
neous financial market; see e.g. [8, 11, 12]. Our approach extends such models two-fold.
Firstly, we replace the driving Brownian motion (BM) by a Le´vy process, which does not
require new techniques. Secondly and more important, we modify the model away from
homogeneity to the above mentioned two-tier market structure, and derive for this a new
limit theorem. We thus enter a new line of research that allows for more flexibility in
modeling the robustness of the financial market and its agents.
Our paper is organised as follows. We introduce the two-tier financial market model
in Section 2 and present subsequently the robustness process for all agents in the market.
In Section 3 we prove a LLN for the new financial system, which may be interpreted as
a propagation of chaos result. The limit model is further studied and used for the sake of
systemic risk assessment in Section 4. We investigate the systemic risk of the market in
terms of the standard deviation risk and the inverse first passage time risk. We examine
in particular the effect of individual risk management decisions on the risk of contagion.
The paper concludes with an outlook on future research in Section 5.
2 The contagion model
2.1 Market model
We model a credit interbank market as a weighted directed graph Gw = (V,E,W ) with a
finite number of vertices |V | = N . This is a common approach, see e.g. [1, 3]. While the
set of vertices V represents the agents in the market, information about their bilateral
credit relationships is encoded in the set E of edges. In the interbank market each agent
i ∈ V manages a credit portfolio Ei ⊂ E, where (i, j) ∈ Ei holds if and only if agent j is a
debtor of agent i. We agree upon that no agent lends to herself, i.e. (i, i) /∈ Ei for all i ∈ V
and denote by Vout(i) = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E} the set of debtors of agent i. Correspondingly,
dout(i) = |Vout(i)| indicates the out-degree of agent i being the number of issued credits by
agent i in our context. The set W endows every edge (i, j) ∈ E with an individual weight
wij ∈ (0, 1], that is, the credit issued from agent i to agent j corresponds to wij · 100 % of
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the total credit amount agent i has issued to the overall interbank market. Consequently,∑
j∈Vout(i)
wij = 1.
In the homogeneous graph of [3] each agent issues credits to exactly 0 ≤ k < N other
agents from the same market so that dout(i) = k for all i ∈ V . Moreover, the credit weights
are assumed to be uniformly wij =
1
k
for all j ∈ Vout(i) and 0 otherwise.
We extend this model to an inhomogeneous graph in the sense that we allow for
two types of agents, the core banks and the periphery banks. There is empirical evidence
for a two-tiered structure of interbank markets: top-tier banks and lower-tier banks, cf.
[4, 5, 18, 20] and in particular [6], which develops a more specific core-periphery network
model. In a simplified purely tiered network top-tier (core) banks can potentially lend to
and borrow from any bank in the network, while lower-tier (periphery) banks exclusively
interact with top-tier banks but not with banks from their own tier.
We underlay this core-periphery interbank market with the following specifying as-
sumptions:
• The interbank market is partitioned into a set of core banks C and a set of periphery
banks P ; i.e., V = C ∪ P .
• The set of debtor banks V Cout(i) of a core bank i ∈ C can be partitioned into the two
subsets
V CCout (i) := {j ∈ C : (i, j) ∈ E} and V CPout (i) := {j ∈ P : (i, j) ∈ E}.
Analogously, for a periphery bank i ∈ P we set
V PPout (i) := {j ∈ P : (i, j) ∈ E} and V PCout (i) := {j ∈ C : (i, j) ∈ E}.
• The banks (nodes) have the following out-degree structure:
dCCout (i) = kCC with 0 ≤ kCC ≤ |C| − 1 for i ∈ C,
dCPout (i) = kCP with 0 ≤ kCP ≤ |P | for i ∈ C,
dPPout (i) = kPP with 0 ≤ kPP ≤ |P | − 1 for i ∈ P,
dPCout (i) = kPC with 0 ≤ kPC ≤ |C| for i ∈ P.
• Each agent acts as a creditor and issues credits to other agents from the same
market:
max{kCC , kCP} > 0 and max{kPP , kPC} > 0.
The adjacency matrix A = (aij)
N
i,j=1 indicates the bilateral credit relationships between
the agents of the network by entries of ones and zeros, more precisely,
aij =
{
1 if (i, j) ∈ E
0 else.
(2.1)
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In view of the two-tiered structure of the market, a block model can be employed, which
is a common approach in social network analysis; cf. [22]. In our case the adjacency
matrix A is a block matrix composed of 4 blocks corresponding to the core and periphery
decomposition of V :
A =
(
CC CP
PC PP
)
. (2.2)
The block CC having dimension |C| × |C| lists the credit relationships among the core
banks, the |P | × |P | block PP provides the information about the relationships among
the periphery banks and the blocks PC and CP cover the exchange of credits between
core and periphery, respectively.
The weighted adjacency matrix Aw = (awij)
N
i,j=1 is defined through
awij =
{
wij if (i, j) ∈ E
0 else.
Example 2.1. [Craig and von Peter [6]] Here the blocks are specified as follows:
• CC is a matrix of ones exceptional the zero diagonal: all core banks issue credits to
all other core banks;
• PP is a matrix of zeros: periphery banks issue no credits among each others;
• CP is row regular, that is, each row has at least one 1: each core bank issues credits
to at least one periphery bank;
• PC is column regular, that is, each column is covered by at least one 1: at least one
periphery bank issues a credit to one of the core banks.

2.2 Financial robustness
Following [3, 8], we endow each agent i ∈ V in our network by a measure called financial
robustness which quantifies an agent’s financial constitution over time. In the following
we specify this measure as a continuous-time stochastic process, where all stochastic
quantities will be defined on a probability space (Ω,F , P ). In our specification we suppose
that the behavior of the financial robustness is related to two sources: On the one hand,
an agent’s robustness depends on the robustness of its debtors. If the debtors’ robustness
is low, an agent has to face higher counterparty risk and, thus, its robustness will suffer as
well. On the other hand, the robustness will also be affected by any non-interbank market
investment. We model this by a vector Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process ρ given as solution of
the vector stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dρt = (A
w − IN×N)ρtdt+ dLt, t ≥ 0, (2.3)
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where L = (Lt)t≥0 denotes an N -dimensional mean 0 Le´vy process with finite variance.
The component (Aw − IN×N)ρt models the interdependence resulting from the agents’
interbank market activity, whereas the Le´vy process covers the impact from external
market sources. By incorporating Aw the robustness process is explicitly addressing the
network structure. For our purposes this network structure is kept constant over time,
which is in line with the findings of [6] about the structural stability of the German
interbank market.
The following result gives the solution of the SDE (2.3) and the second order moment
structure.
Proposition 2.2. For the SDE (2.3) with ρt = (ρ
1
t , . . . , ρ
N
t ) and initial vector ρ0 =
(ρ10, . . . , ρ
N
0 ) the following assertions hold.
(a) The SDE has a unique explicit solution given by
ρt = exp [t(A
w − IN×N)] ρ0 +
∫ t
0
exp [(t− s)(Aw − IN×N)] dLs, t ≥ 0, (2.4)
with the matrix exponential exp[X] :=
∑∞
m=0
1
m!
Xm, and IN×N is the unit matrix.
(b) The mean of the process is given by
E [ρt | ρ0] = exp [t(Aw − IN×N)] ρ0, t ≥ 0.
(c) For every t, t′ > 0 the covariance matrix function is given by
Cov [ρt, ρt′ ] = Σ
min(t,t′)∫
0
exp [(t− s)(Aw − IN×N)] exp
[
(t′ − s)(Aw − IN×N)>
]
ds,
where Σ is the diagonal variance matrix of L1.
For information and details on Le´vy processes we refer to [2] or [16].
3 Financial robustness in large networks
If we pick out one row of Eq. (2.3), then the financial robustness of agent i ∈ V follows
the dynamic
dρit =
( ∑
j∈Vout(i)
wijρ
j
t − ρit
)
dt+ dLit, i ∈ V. (3.1)
As described above the drift term adjusts the process towards the mean robustness of agent
i’s debtors. Note that the mean is calculated over ρjt with j 6= i, hence this ensemble mean
is independent of the driving process Li.
When all weights wij are chosen to be equal and the driving process is a Brownian
motion, then this is a classical example in physics for interacting particle systems going
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back to McKean. We extend McKean’s mean field example of interacting diffusions to the
inhomogeneous system (2.4) driven by independent Le´vy processes.
We choose the weights wij based on the following market assumption, which are in line
with with a perfectly tiered interbank market as considered in [6]. All core banks interact
with each other and every periphery bank is creditor and debtor to every core bank. For
the periphery banks, any credit relationship among them is excluded. Then the SDE (3.1)
becomes
dρit =
( ∑
j∈C\{i}
wijρ
j
t +
∑
k∈P
wikρ
k
t − ρit
)
dt+ σCdL
i
t, i ∈ C, (3.2)
dρkt =
(∑
i∈C
wkiρ
i
t − ρkt
)
dt+ σPdL
k
t , k ∈ P, (3.3)
where all Le´vy processes are independent with mean E[Li1] = 0, and standardized second
moment E[(Li1)
2] = 1 for i ∈ V . The constants σC , σP > 0 model the standard deviations
of the core and periphery banks respectively. The Le´vy processes Li are for all i ∈ C
identically distributed, as well as the Lk for all k ∈ P . Moreover, we assume the following
simple scenario for the weights. For all i ∈ C we assume that wij = 1−ε|C|−1 for j ∈ C \ {i}
and for some ε ∈ (0, 1), and also that wik = ε|P | for k ∈ P , so that
∑N
j=1, j 6=iwij = 1. For
all k ∈ P we assume that wki = 1|C| for all i ∈ C and wki = 0 for all i ∈ P . Then (3.2)
and (3.3) read as
dρit =
( 1− ε
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
ρjt +
ε
|P |
∑
k∈P
ρkt − ρit
)
dt+ σCdL
i
t, i ∈ C, (3.4)
dρkt =
( 1
|C|
∑
i∈C
ρit − ρkt
)
dt+ σPdL
k
t , k ∈ P. (3.5)
This is a coupled system, where the robustness of the core banks is influenced by the
mean robustness of all other core banks and the mean robustness of all periphery banks.
The robustness of the periphery banks, on the other hand, is influenced by that of the
core banks only. We prove a LLN for the empirical distributions given by the weighted
sums when the system becomes large; i.e. for N →∞.
Theorem 3.1. Assume the core-periphery model (3.4) and (3.5) with independent driving
Le´vy processes, which are identically distributed for all i ∈ C and all k ∈ P , respectively.
Define the limit system by the dynamics
dρit =
(
(1− ε)E[ρCt ] + εE[ρPt ]− ρit
)
dt+ σCdL
i
t, i ∈ C, (3.6)
dρkt =
(
E[ρCt ]− ρkt
)
dt+ σPdL
k
t , k ∈ P, (3.7)
where E[ρCt ] =
∫
R yµ
C
t (dy) and E[ρ
P
t ] =
∫
R yµ
P
t (dy); i.e. µ
C
t is the distribution of ρ
i
t for all
i ∈ C and µPt that of ρkt for all k ∈ P . Take the same driving Le´vy processes as above and
the same initial conditions ρi0 = ρ
i
0 for i ∈ V , independent of all Le´vy processes. Denote
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|x − y|∗T := supt≤T |xt − yt|. Then for every T > 0, |C|/|P | ≤ M < ∞, and a constant
c > 0 independent of |C|,√
|C|E[|ρi − ρi|∗T ] ≤ c <∞, i ∈ V. (3.8)
Proof. For the proof we adapt the arguments of the proof of Theorem 1.4 of Sznitman [19]
to the inhomogenous system. First note that for k ∈ P
ρkt − ρkt =
∫ t
0
ds
{( 1
|C|
∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])
)
− (ρks − ρks)
}
.
Summing this equality over all k ∈ P , and using the fact that ρk and ρk for k ∈ P are
equally distributed, respectively, we obtain for l ∈ P and some K > 0 (K always denotes
some positive constant, whose value may vary from line to line) by taking the modulus
under the Lebesgue integral
|P |E[|ρl − ρl|∗T ] =
∑
k∈P
E[|ρk − ρk|∗T ] ≤ K
∫ T
0
ds
{∑
k∈P
E
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])− (ρks − ρks)
∣∣∣]}.
Now we estimate for l ∈ P using the triangular inequality
E[|ρl − ρl|∗T ] ≤ K
∫ T
0
ds
{
E
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])
∣∣∣]+ E[ 1|P |∑
k∈P
∣∣ρks − ρks ∣∣]}
= K
∫ T
0
ds
{
E
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])
∣∣∣]+ E[∣∣ρls − ρls∣∣]}.
Hence, the structure of this inequality is of the form ready to apply Gronwall’s Lemma,
which yields
E[|ρl − ρl|∗T ] ≤ K
∫ T
0
dsE
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])
∣∣∣]. (3.9)
Next note that for i ∈ C
ρit − ρit =
∫ t
0
ds
{ 1− ε
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
ρjs − (1− ε)ρis + (1− ε)(ρis − E[ρCs ])
+
ε
|P |
∑
k∈P
ρks − ερis + ε(ρis − E[ρPs ])
}
.
We take all terms under the integral corresponding to the core banks and obtain (we
dropped the factor 1− ε)
1
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
ρjs − ρis + (ρis − E[ρCs ])
=
1
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
{(
ρjs − ρjs
)− (ρis − ρis)+ (ρjs − E[ρCs ])}.
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Then we take all terms under the integral corresponding to the periphery banks (dropped
the factor ε) and obtain
1
|P |
∑
k∈P
ρks − ρis +
(
ρis − E[ρPs ]
)
=
1
|P |
∑
k∈P
{(
ρks − ρks
)− (ρis − ρis)+ (ρks − E[ρPs ])} .
Now we estimate for i ∈ C, taking the modulus under the Lebesgue integral and use the
triangular inequality
E[|ρi − ρi|∗T ]
≤ K
∫ T
0
ds
 1− ε|C| − 1 ∑
j∈C\{i}
(
E[|ρjs − ρjs|] + E[|ρis − ρis|]
)
+ E
∣∣∣ 1− ε|C| − 1 ∑
j∈C\{i}
(ρjs − E[ρCs ])
∣∣∣

+
ε
|P |
∑
k∈P
(
E[|ρks − ρks |] + E[|ρis − ρis|]
)
+ E
[∣∣∣ ε|P |∑
k∈P
(ρks − E[ρPs ])
∣∣∣]} .
Summing the previous inequality over all i ∈ C, which are identically distributed, as well
as all ρk for k ∈ P ,
|C|E[|ρ1 − ρ1|∗T ] =
∑
i∈C
E[|ρi − ρi|∗T ]
≤ K
∫ T
0
ds
(1− ε)∑
i∈C
E[|ρis − ρis|] + (1− ε)E
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈C\{i}
(
ρjs − E[ρCs ]
)∣∣∣

+ε
∑
i∈C
( 1
|P |
∑
k∈P
E[|ρks − ρks |] + E[|ρis − ρis|]
)
+ εE
[∣∣∣ |C||P |∑
k∈P
(ρks − E[ρPs ])
∣∣∣]}
= K
∫ T
0
ds
(1− ε)∑
i∈C
E[|ρis − ρis|] + (1− ε)E
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈C\{i}
(
ρjs − E[ρCs ]
)∣∣∣

+ε
∑
i∈C
E[|ρis − ρis|] + εE
[∣∣∣ |C||P |∑
k∈P
(ρks − E[ρPs ])
∣∣∣]}+Kε∑
i∈C
∫ T
0
ds
{
1
|P |
∑
k∈P
E[|ρks − ρks |]
}
To estimate the last integral we use the fact that for k ∈ P all expectations are equal, and
take under the integral the supremum over all s ∈ [0, T ]. This gives for arbitrary l ∈ P∫ T
0
ds
1
|P |
∑
k∈P
E[|ρks − ρks |] ≤ TE[|ρl − ρl|∗T ] ≤ TK
∫ T
0
dsE
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])
∣∣∣],
where the last inequality follows from the bound in (3.9). Now we take this term back
under the common integral, recall that all our bounds depend on T and call TK again
simply K. Then adding and subtracting ρis in the above bound, and using the triangular
inequality,
|C|E[|ρ1 − ρ1|∗T ]
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≤ K
∫ T
0
ds
{∑
i∈C
E[|ρis − ρis|] + E
[∣∣∣∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])
∣∣∣]+ E [∣∣∣ |C||P |∑
k∈P
(ρks − E[ρPs ])
∣∣∣]} .
This implies
E[|ρ1 − ρ1|∗T ] =
1
|C|
∑
i∈C
E[|ρi − ρi|∗T ] (3.10)
≤ K
∫ T
0
ds
{
E[|ρ1s − ρ1s|] + E
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(
ρis − E[ρCs ]
)∣∣∣]+ E [∣∣∣ 1|P |∑
k∈P
(
ρks − E[ρPs ]
)∣∣∣]} ,
hence, by Gronwall’s Lemma,
E[|ρ1 − ρ1|∗T ] (3.11)
≤ K
∫ T
0
(
E
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])
∣∣∣]+ E [∣∣∣ 1|P |∑
k∈P
(ρks − E[ρPs ])
∣∣∣]) ds.
Now we have for i, j ∈ V , since all ρi, ρj are independent,
cov(ρis, ρ
j
s) = E[(ρ
i
s − E[ρC/Ps ])(ρjs − E[ρC/Ps ])] = 0,
so that by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, for all s ∈ [0, T ],(
E
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(
ρis − E[ρCs ]
)∣∣∣])2 ≤ 1|C|2E[(∑
i∈C
(ρis − E[ρCs ])
)2]
=
1
|C|2
∑
i∈C
E
[
(ρis − E[ρCs ])2
]
≤ 1|C|K
2
C , (3.12)
where K2C does not depend on |C|. The same argument applies for the sum over P , so
that we obtain from (3.11)
E[|ρ1 − ρ1|∗T ] ≤ K
(
1√|C|KC + 1√|P |KP
)
<∞. (3.13)
For l ∈ P we go back to (3.9) and, invoking (3.12) and (3.13), we find
E[|ρl − ρl|∗T ] ≤ K
(
E[|ρ1 − ρ1|∗T ] +
∫ T
0
ds
{
E
[∣∣∣ 1|C|∑
i∈C
(
ρis − E[ρCs ]
)∣∣∣]})
≤ K
(
2√|C|KC + 1√|P |KP
)
.
This implies the result.
Remark 3.2. (1) Note that in the limit system (3.6) and (3.7) all processes are inde-
pendent, so that we have propagation of chaos, meaning that for the system size getting
large, all robustness processes become independent.
(2) From the result (3.8) we see that all banks are mean reverted to a mean process
provided that the number of core banks gets large, and the number of core banks and
periphery banks satisfy a certain growth condition. In a real market we would think of
many more periphery banks than core banks, so that |C|/|P | → 0 as N →∞ would seem
realistic. 
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4 Risk management in the core-periphery market
In order to study certain diversification effects in the core-periphery bank model we in-
troduce, similar to [8, 11, 12], friction parameters θC , θP > 0 for the core banks and the
periphery banks, respectively. Hence, the model (3.4) and (3.5) is extended to
dρit = θC
( 1− ε
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
ρjt +
ε
|P |
∑
k∈P
ρkt − ρit
)
dt+ σCdL
i
t, i ∈ C, (4.1)
dρkt = θP
( 1
|C|
∑
i∈C
ρit − ρkt
)
dt+ σPdL
k
t , k ∈ P. (4.2)
Corollary 4.1. The conclusions of Theorem 3.6 hold true for the extended model (4.1)
and (4.2) with corresponding limit dynamics
dρit = θC
(
(1− ε)E[ρCt ] + εE[ρPt ]− ρit
)
dt+ σCdL
i
t, i ∈ C, (4.3)
dρkt = θP
(
E[ρCt ]− ρkt
)
dt+ σPdL
k
t , k ∈ P. (4.4)
We consider θC and θP as parameters emphasizing how strong the corresponding agent
is weighting interbank activity in its investment strategy; i.e., a higher value indicates a
larger investment into interbank credits. This higher value will increase the effect of the
mean reversion term in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamic.
We start the discussion by a simulation study based on Eq. (2.3) for the finite net-
work with the specific structure assumed in Theorem 3.1 and the additionally introduced
friction parameters; that is
dρt = Θ(A
w − IN×N)ρtdt+ ΣdLt, t ≥ 0, (4.5)
where Θ and Σ are diagonal matrices with diagonals θ = (θC , . . . , θC , θP , . . . , θP ) and
σ = (σC , . . . , σC , σP , . . . , σP ), respectively, for positive constants θC , θP , σC and σP . For
our simulation we choose N = 55 as network size with |C| = 5 and |P | = 50. For all
our simulations the robustness processes start in 1 and are driven by Brownian motions.
Based on data in [6] we take ε = 0.58.
4.1 Hedging changes in the market volatility
We examine the consequences of changes in the market volatilities to either core or periph-
ery banks, based on the paths of the agents’ robustnesses. We consider different scenarios.
Initially core and periphery will face the same economic environment and we choose
σC = σP = 0.2 and θC = θP = 1, respectively. For this choice of parameters Figure 1
shows in the upper left plot sample paths of the robustness for all five core banks and five
(out of 50) periphery banks. In a next step we suppose higher volatility in the market.
Whereas core banks can keep the volatility of their non-interbank assets constant due to
sophisticated hedging strategies; i.e., the same value σC = 0.2 holds, periphery banks do
not have the resources and expertise for such methods. Hence, the standard deviation of
10
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Figure 1: Realized robustness processes of a simulation on the core-periphery banking network as de-
scribed in the text. The robustness of the five core banks are depicted in black and five (out of 50)
periphery banks in red. All four plots are simulated with the same random seed, but differ due to varying
parameters σP and θP . In all four plots σC = 0.2 and θC = 1 remain constant.
their non-interbank assets increases to σP = 0.5. If periphery banks do not undertake a
shift of their assets but keep their investment strategy unchanged, their robustness will
show a higher variation, which is confirmed by the upper right plot in Figure 1. The two
lower plots in the same figure highlight that an increase of θP (by increased investment
into interbank credits) can reduce variation.
A further analysis of the consequences of such a change in the market volatility is
summarized in Table 4.1, where ρˆP1 is the estimated robustness of one periphery bank
at time t = 1 based on 100 simulation runs for varying parameters of θP . The standard
errors in brackets indicate that an increase of θP can indeed reduce the variation in the
robustness of a periphery bank.
So far, our model suggests that periphery banks can reduce uncertainty in their robust-
ness, resulting from higher volatility in non-interbank assets, by higher investment into
interbank assets. This strategy has certain drawbacks, when a shock hits all core banks’
robustness at the same instant of time. For pointing out the resulting effect we redo the
simulations and assume a reduction of all core banks’ robustness by 0.3 at t = 0.9 and
investigate the market at t = 1 (immediately after the shock) and at t = 2. Such a shock,
being restricted to the core, means that for a short term the robustness of core banks and
periphery banks will diverge. However, due to the mean reversion in Eq. (4.5) the mean
of core and periphery banks’ robustnesses will again revert to a common value in the long
run (cf. Corollary 4.3 below). Table 4.1 illustrates that in a shock scenario an increased
θP still reduces variation, but a shocked core will affect the periphery more intensive for
higher values of θP . For smaller values of θP the robustness of the periphery banks ex-
hibits a lower sensitivity with respect to the shock on the core. In this case core banks
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without shock (t = 1) with shock (t = 1) with shock (t = 2)
θP ρˆ
P
1 ρˆ
C
1 ρˆ
P
1 ρˆ
C
1 ρˆ
P
2 ρˆ
C
2
1 0.99 (0.34) 0.98 (0.14) 0.96 (0.34) 0.70 (0.14) 0.77 (0.33) 0.75 (0.15)
3 1.00 (0.22) 0.98 (0.14) 0.92 (0.22) 0.69 (0.14) 0.71 (0.24) 0.71 (0.15)
6 1.00 (0.16) 0.98 (0.14) 0.86 (0.16) 0.69 (0.14) 0.70 (0.19) 0.70 (0.15)
10 1.00 (0.14) 0.98 (0.14) 0.81 (0.14) 0.69 (0.14) 0.69 (0.16) 0.69 (0.16)
15 1.00 (0.13) 0.98 (0.14) 0.77 (0.13) 0.69 (0.14) 0.69 (0.15) 0.69 (0.16)
20 1.00 (0.12) 0.98 (0.14) 0.74 (0.12) 0.69 (0.14) 0.69 (0.14) 0.68 (0.16)
25 1.00 (0.11) 0.98 (0.14) 0.72 (0.11) 0.69 (0.14) 0.69 (0.14) 0.68 (0.16)
Table 4.1: Estimated robustness of one core and one periphery bank, respectively. Presented are the
empirical means based on 100 simulation runs with standard errors in brackets. The figures are based
on a scenario of increased volatility; i.e., an increase from σP = 0.2 to σP = 0.5. The simulation for the
original volatility and mean reversion, σP = 0.2 and θP = 1, results in the mean estimate ρˆ
P
1 = 0.99 with
standard error 0.14. Thus, in the regime of higher market volatility a periphery bank can approximate
the magnitude of variation from the previous regime of lower volatility by setting θP = 10.
can in turn benefit from their interbank activity with more robust periphery banks. This
becomes apparent in the estimates of the robustness at t = 2, which show approximately
the new common robustness of core and periphery in the post-shock regime. Apparently,
for θP = 1 the core banks can at least recover partially from the shock, which is, however,
not the case any more, if θP becomes too large.
Overall, we conclude that periphery banks can have an incentive to invest more into
the interbank market in order to hedge their volatility, however, the increase of interbank
investment makes them more vulnerable for contagion resulting from a core-wide shock.
The whole network will also suffer, if the periphery invests too much into the core as
the increased sensitivity of the periphery with respect to the core’s constitution will have
negative feedback effects on the core itself and its ability to recover from past shock events.
4.2 Risk management of structural breaks in the market
In this section we want to shed light on the outcome of the previous simulations in a more
concrete way by relying on first passage times.
The following corollary presents the first and second moments of the limit processes.
Corollary 4.2. The SDEs (4.3) and (4.4) of the limit model have independent Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck dynamics with solutions
ρit = e
−θCt ρi0 + θC
∫ t
0
e−θC(t−u)((1− ε)E[ρCu ] + εE[ρPu ])du+ σC
∫ t
0
e−θC(t−u)dLiu, i ∈ C,
ρkt = e
−θP t ρk0 + θP
∫ t
0
e−θP (t−u)E[ρCu ]du+ σP
∫ t
0
e−θP (t−u)dLku, k ∈ P,
Moreover, ρit for i = 1, . . . , N have second order moment structure
E[ρit | ρi0 = ai] = e−θCtai + θC
∫ t
0
e−θC(t−u)
(
(1− ε)E[ρCu ] + εE[ρPu ]
)
du, i ∈ C,
12
E[ρkt | ρk0 = ak] = e−θP tak + θP
∫ t
0
e−θP (t−u)E[ρCu ]du, k ∈ P,
Var[ρit | ρi0 = ai] =
σ2C
2θC
(1− e−2θCt), i ∈ C
Var[ρkt | ρk0 = ak] =
σ2P
2θP
(1− e−2θP t), k ∈ P
Cov[ρis, ρ
i
t | ρi0 = ai] =
σ2C
2θC
(e−θC |s−t| − e−θC(s+t)), i ∈ C
Cov[ρks , ρ
k
t | ρk0 = ak] =
σ2P
2θP
(e−θP |s−t| − e−θP (s+t)), k ∈ P.
Provided there exists a stationary version of the system of Corollary 4.2, this stationary
model has constant means and variances of the core and periphery banks, respectively.
They are obtained from the above moments for t→∞, which yields E[ρC ] = E[ρP ] =: µ
and Var[ρi] = σ2C/(2θC) for i ∈ C and Var[ρk] = σ2P/(2θP ) for k ∈ P . The resulting
stationary dynamics lead to a further simplification of the original model.
Corollary 4.3. Stationary versions of the SDEs in Corollary 4.2 are given by
dρit = θC
(
µ− ρit
)
dt+ σCdL
i
t, i ∈ C,
dρkt = θP
(
µ− ρkt
)
dt+ σPdL
k
t , k ∈ P,
where µ is the a.s. limit of the mean robustness of the core banks 1|C|
∑
i∈C ρ
i
t as |C| → ∞
for all t ≥ 0.
Consequently, for a large number of core and periphery banks, we can discuss various
risk measures by relying on the simple Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamic of Corollary 4.3. As
a first risk measure we consider the standard deviation.
Definition 4.4. For each bank we define the standard deviation risk
Si =
√
σ2C/(2θC) for i ∈ C and Sk =
√
σ2P/(2θP ) for k ∈ P.

It is certainly one goal of every bank i ∈ V to keep Si within certain bounds and at
best constant (cf. [12]). As a second risk measure we define the inverse of the mean first
passage time of the robustness of an agent.
Definition 4.5. For every bank i ∈ V denote the inverse first passage time risk (IFPT
risk) by
τi = 1/E[Ti(0)]
where Ti(0) := inf{t ≥ 0 : ρit = 0} denotes the first passage time of ρi to 0. 
First passage events have also served as triggering events to start a cascading mecha-
nism in the market (e.g. Battiston et al. [3]). For a mathematical analysis [3] approximates
the first passage time of a mean reverting OU process simply by that of Brownian motion.
We prefer to work with the following precise formula.
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Lemma 4.6. Assume the core-periphery bank system driven by independent Brownian
motions and assume that all robustness processes are solutions to the SDEs in Corol-
lary 4.3 with starting values ρi0 = 1 for all i ∈ V . Define α := σ/
√
2θ and let Φ = 1− Φ
denote the tail and ϕ the density of the standard normal distribution. Let T (0) denote the
first passage time of a generic bank ρ to 0. Then the following hold:
E[T (0)] = 2
α
σ2
∫ 1
0
Φ(v−µ
α
)
ϕ(v−µ
α
)
dv =
1
θ
∫ (1−µ)/α
−µ/α
Φ(y)
ϕ(y)
dy. (4.6)
Proof. According to Prop. 4 of [21] the first passage time of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dXt = θ(µ−Xt)dt+ σdWt
which starts in 1 to hit 0 for the first time has expectation
E[T (0)] =
√
4pi
θσ2
∫ 1
0
exp
{(v − µ
σ
)2
θ
}
P
(
N
(
µ,
σ2
2θ
)
> v
)
dv, (4.7)
where N(·, ·) is a normal random variable with mean and variance in the first and second
component. Then, setting α := σ/
√
2θ, we get
E[T (0)] =
√
4pi
θσ2
∫ 1
0
exp
{(v − µ
σ
)2
θ
}
P
(
µ+
√
σ2
2θ
N(0, 1) > v
)
dv
=
√
4pi
σ2
∫ 1
0
1√
θ
exp
{(v − µ
σ
)2
θ
}
Φ
(√
2θ
v − µ
σ
)
dv
=
2α
σ2
∫ 1
0
√
2pi exp
{
1
2
(v − µ
α
)2}
Φ
(v − µ
α
)
dv. (4.8)
so that, since exp{−y2/2} = √2piϕ(√2θy), the integrand can be rewritten as
f
(v − µ
α
)
:= Φ
(v − µ
α
)/
ϕ
(v − µ
α
)
,
where a substitution of variables yields the final result.
The first passage time Ti(0) of the robustness process of bank i can be interpreted as
default of a bank. Hence, any bank will surely aim to keep τi low.
We will asses the risk management of a periphery bank in a more quantitative manner,
if structural breaks on the core occur. The risk measures of interest are the standard
deviation risk SP =
√
σ2P/(2θP ) and the IFPT τP for any periphery bank.
We first come back to the scenario in Section 4.1, where we have found out that for a
bank with fixed target value for SP , when the volatility σP is varying, the periphery bank
can hedge this by choosing an appropriate θP . Now we can quantify this value, namely,
θP = σ
2
P/(2S
2
P ) (4.9)
for any value of σP . Particularly, an increase of σP requires an increase in θP , which is
in line with the simulations illustrated in Figure 1. For σP changing from 0.2 to 0.5 (cf.
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Figure 2: IFPT risk for different values of µ as a function of θP .
Section 4.1), for instance, Eq. (4.9) suggests a required increase of θP from 1 to 6.25 in
order to keep the standard deviation risk SP constant at its initial value 0.1414. Without
changing θP the periphery bank would have to accept the standard deviation risk SP
rising from 0.1414 to 0.3535 implying a higher uncertainty for the future robustness.
As noticed from the values in Table 4.1 larger values of θP , however, may reinforce
the decrease of a periphery bank’s robustness, if the robustness of core banks is relatively
low. This drawback of increasing θP becomes apparent, if one takes the IFPT risk τP into
account. Figure 2 shows how the IFPT risk depends on θP for σP = 0.5 and different values
of the mean robustness µ in the core. A reduction in SP by enlarging θP has beneficial
effects on the IFPT risk only as long as µ stays sufficiently large. However, for values of
µ near zero an increase of θP results in a massive increase of the IFPT risk.
We like to substantiate this by a final example which adopts the setting of Section 4.1;
i.e., we assume again an increase of volatility from σP = 0.2 to σP = 0.5 hitting the
periphery. Instead of hedging SP we now aim at keeping the IFPT risk τP constant by
adjusting θP correspondingly. For µ = 0.5 and the assumed volatility scenarios, we have
computed – by applying a numerical rootfinder to Eq. (4.6) – that a periphery bank
must increase θP from 1 to 8.6 in order to keep τP constant at the low level of τP = 0.002.
Otherwise, without an adjustment of the interbank investment volume, the IFPT τP would
jump to 0.192. For an illustration, see Figure 3, which compares τP for both alternatives,
increase of θP and no increase of θP .
Similar to the case of hedging SP previously, the drawback of keeping τP constant
arises, if µ changes. Assume that some structural break within the core occurs, resulting
from an external shock, which cuts now the mean robustness of the core banks. Figure 3
suggests that the remedy of an increased investment into interbank asset would turn out
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Figure 3: IFPT risk for different values of the mean robustness µ in the core of the interbank market.
The figure compares two investment strategies: Increase of interbank assets vs. no increase of interbank
assets in a regime of σC = 0.2 and σP = 0.5.
to be the worse alternative as soon as the core robustness experienced a reduction in the
mean robustness of slightly more than 0.2. When such an event happens, the periphery
bank’s IFPT risk would have been smaller without increasing the interbank investment
for hedging the IFPT risk τP under increased volatility.
5 Conclusion
Based on empirical evidence we employed a hierarchical block model for modelling the
interbank market as a network, in which a small number of highly connected large banks
(the core) play the role of financial intermediaries for a large number of smaller banks
(the periphery). We introduced the financial robustness of the agents as continuous-time
stochastic processes explicitly incorporating the market structure. Further, we proved a
LLN for this coupled multivariate system as the network size grows. We proved that
in the limit system all processes are independent, hence, the system decouples more and
more as the network enlarges. This behaviour is called propagation of chaos in the physics
community.
In a first simulation approach on the core-periphery network we have pointed out that
risk management decisions, although being meaningful from the perspective of a single
agent may accelerate the negative effects of a system-wide distortion. Our application is
based on the assumption that core banks have more expertise and resources available for
performing sophisticated risk management measures in order to hedge volatility success-
fully on the non-interbank market. In contrast, the only possibility of periphery banks to
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hedge increasing volatility occurring in their non-interbank assets portfolio is provided by
expanding the investment into interbank assets, that is for instance an increase of deposits
at core banks. Our model and the chosen risk measures in Section 4.2 disclose some ana-
lytical tools for evaluating the risk management decisions of a periphery bank under such
conditions. As in previous simulation approaches we have observed that periphery banks
can hedge volatility via increasing interbank investments, however, this at first effective
hedging activity may become a drawback in the case of external shocks hitting parts of
the network.
In our paper we have established a framework, which gives a basis for further exami-
nation of the interbank market - particularly under the viewpoint of interaction between
periphery and core banks. Further research will relax the still restrictive core-periphery
model from Section 3 and prove an analogue of Theorem 3.1 with off-diagonal blocks in
the core-periphery adjacency matrix allowing for a higher degree of heterogeneity by not
assuming full lending relationships. Also central limit theorems, Poisson limit results and
large deviation results will provide further interpretations for systemic risk.
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